OK so back on the blog horse.

RSA has come and gone, and in the month since reflecting, of a sort, has been happening here.  All the work I saw there stimulated much thought and especially much thought about who we write for and what it is we hope to accomplish in our scholarship.  I say we--of course I mean me.

And for this blog's RSA panel, what of that?  We had, I thought, an excellent discussion.  As I recall, the key thing that emerged from the discussion was a real putting to the test of the idea that just because we are all doing historical work, that we are all doing the same thing.  I said at the panel that what was most interesting about the work of that 10 months or so (!) was that we never really came to any kind of agreement about what our key terms, philosophy, history, rhetoric, meant individually, much less in combination.  The discussion itself suggested that some of the divisions we've pointed out throughout this blog--namely intellectual history and 'on-the-ground' history--determine the way we think about what historical work is, how it operates in the field of rhetoric, and how it stands in relation to a philosophical history.  It was clear for instance that while the definition of rhetorical history as a history of rhetorical instruction (this general idea was discussed I think earlier in the blog, though at the RSA discussion was put specifically in terms of an article by Mike Leff and Richard Graff) could not adequately capture the work we were all doing. 

Thinking again on the idea of rhetoric as a(nti-)historical, and how that connects to an idea, perhaps more prevalent in comp/rhet than in comm (?) that the proper object of study for the historian of rhetoric is the history of rhetorical instruction.  I want to pin this on Sharon Crowley, though I may be off there--it more just strikes me as an idea that saturates.  But if indeed we take rhetoric as somehow operating in a different register (at the least) than history--if it is indeed an absolute continuity or solidity that sees itself outside of time, as Barthes suggests (or as I keep reading an earlier post of Christopher's as suggesting that Barthes suggests)--does that make more or less palatable the desire to somehow link up contemporary pedagogical concerns with historical precedent?  This is a move that's sort of (anecdotally at least) standard in comp/rhet, I think it's fair to say.  Susan Jarratt does this in the last chapter or two of Rereading the Sophists, and in a very sophisticated way.  Others do so in a more pro-forma way, perhaps as an effort to legitimize historical work, or make it relevant, or get it published.  But maybe there's a way to make this move more intellectually radical, perhaps by suggesting or emphasizing the very ahistorical nature of rhetoric?

ethics and pragmatism

OK--the drafty post below notwithstanding, here's the question:

As regards defintions of our 'historical' work from a disciplinary perspective, Brandon suggests a "probability-based relativist-pragmatic one: the better of two arguments, as interpreted by an audience, often becomes socially-constructed meaning and reinforces/determines the course of events."

the question:  how is this different than Machiavelli's pedagogical imperative--to show things "not as they ought to be, but as they are"?

Here at the 4Cs, seeing a history panel and other things, enjoying Louisville I would say.  Supposed to say something or include something from the Cs homepage when blogging from the conference, can't remember what so let's just say this statement serves that purpose, with apologies.  I'm thinking about Brandon's most recent post and also thinking about this project, this thinking about the philosophy of history of rhetoric, and maybe it's just being someplace surrounded by a combination of really amazing insights and always already empty jargon, and I'm wondering what it means to think about this question.  Rethinking, doubting, etc. 

Disciplining the Conversation?

This conversation is starting to steer us in the direction of our "marginal" disciplinary status.

I guess when making my claims on the status of a philosophy of history "in rhetoric" I was thinking more of a perspective than a discipline.  So when a Foucault or White deny/deconstruct German historicism, they are being "rhetorical" by my all-encompassing, linguistic-turn notion.

Continuing Controversy

To extend Brandon's previous post and the comments that follow it:  It appears we are begininning to make some fun and contentious claims.  Namely, that what we do as historians of rhetoric is somewhat boundless--that we can take any historical material and make it our own, and that our analyses hold weight even when they impinge on others's disciplinary territory.  Another claim is that the history of rhetoric, or just rhetoric, is anti-historical.  It resists any philosophy of history as classically understood.  It rejects progress, spirit, telos.  It is, I suppose, a sort of timeless continuity, eternal contingency.

We reject discipline.  We reject history.  Is that right?

Creating Controversy

The main "controversy" I see so far (or one I'll invent for discussion) might be a gap between those who are radically contextual and those who admit ideological motivation to what they're doing.

1: To explain, I think some of us are saying that we are trying to purposely rewrite history, to tell another tale than "History."  Our motivations are to break up old narratives, help the marginal folks in History gain some prominence (esp. against race/class/gender bias), or maybe as Gorgias said of his Encomium, amuse oursleves.  Do any of you all claim one of these specifically as your primary motivation?

2: Others of us claim to be focusing on an object and deriving any theory or approach we have from that object.  My guess is that everyone would at least claim some motivations to their work, at least for the sake of interest in the object they study.  However, they would prioritize the object first, and profess to hold no preconceived framework.  Are there some of you out there?

Despite my "Ode to Arendt," I usually profess #2 first and then back it up with #1if pressured to admit my historiographic biases.  What about the rest of you?